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Abstract: The Dental Residency Match (DRM) program provides an ethical and unbiased selection process for applicants to 
postdoctoral dental programs, based on mutual interests of applicants and programs. The aims of this study were to conduct a 
descriptive analysis of DRM metrics for the years 2008 to 2015 and to test the hypothesis that there was a difference in number of 
ranks submitted between programs that filled all their offered positions and those that did not. DRM metrics data from years 2008 
to 2015 were obtained from the National Matching Service. Trend analyses and panel data assessments were made. Six types of 
postdoctoral dental programs (GPR, AEGD, oral and maxillofacial surgery, pediatric dentistry, orthodontics, and dental anesthe-
siology) participate in the DRM program. The results showed that the number of programs participating and number of residency 
positions offered increased over the study period. The programs that filled all their positions ranked more applicants than the 
programs that did not fill their positions (p<0.05). The number of acceptable applicants increased over the study period for all 
programs except those in dental anesthesiology. These results suggest that participation in DRM is increasing, most programs 
are able to fill their positions with acceptable applicants, and programs seeking to fill all their positions need to submit a large 
number of ranks. 
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Dental specialty and postdoctoral general dentistry (PGD) education programs are at critical crossroads. Educational debt is high, 
which may have some impact on new graduates’ 
choosing to enter practice immediately rather than 
applying to a specialty or PGD program, especially 
when their debts exceed $100,000.1 The emergence 
of alternative mechanisms to obtain specialty board 
certification (not requiring recognition by the Ameri-
can Dental Association [ADA] Council on Dental 
Education) may also affect enrollment in advanced 
education.2 Total application numbers and first-year 
enrollment in PGD and specialty programs have 
seen small increases in recent years. In 2011-12, 
there were  53,585 applications and 3,372 enroll-
ments in PGD and specialty programs, while for 
2015-16, there were 57,212 applications and 3,592 
enrollments.3
The large pool of applicants and the variety 
of program choices create significant challenges for 
applicants, particularly in identifying which program 
is the best fit for them. From a program’s perspective, 
it becomes a challenge to recruit the right candidates 
given the competitive nature of the application pool. 
This fierce competition also engenders some moral 
and ethical dilemmas. For example, is it ethical to 
pressure competitive candidates to accept a posi-
tion through early binding offers, without giving 
them time to carefully consider their career and life 
choices? An overarching goal for any program should 
be to achieve a high level of competitiveness and 
desirability for potential candidates. An early and 
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2008 to 2015 and to test the hypothesis that there was 
a difference in number of ranks submitted between 
programs that filled all offered positions and those 
that did not fill all offered positions.
Methods
Since the study used publicly available data, In-
stitutional Review Board exempt status was granted 
by the Office of Human Subjects Protection at the 
University of Iowa (IRB # 201508768). For the study, 
we used summary statistics from the National Resi-
dency Matching Program (NRMP) website (www.
natmatch.com/dentres/aboutstats.html) for the years 
2008 to 2015. 
Data were collected from the NRMP website 
(www.natmatch.com/dentres/stats/2016progstats.
html) for the following variables: programs par-
ticipating in Match; positions offered in Match; 
average number of rankings submitted by programs 
(programs filling all positions and programs with 
unfilled positions); number of applicants ranked by 
at least one program (“acceptable applicants”); ratio 
of acceptable applicants to position; percentage of 
programs/positions filled in Match; and, for three 
ADA-recognized specialties (oral and maxillofacial 
surgery, pediatric dentistry, and orthodontics), dis-
tribution of ratio of the least preferred matched rank 
to the number of positions filled (this quantifies how 
far down the list a program went to fill its positions). 
Simple descriptive statistics were used to sum-
marize the data. Trend analyses and panel data as-
sessments were performed to determine longitudinal 
changes in the metrics. Plots were used to present 
the data in figures. The average numbers of ranks 
submitted per position were compared between pro-
grams that filled all offered positions and those that 
did not fill all offered positions by using Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test within each year. In this approach, 
the unit of analysis was the individual year. Within 
each year, the total number of ranks submitted by 
programs that completely filled their positions was 
also compared with the number of ranks submitted 
by programs that did not fill their positions. Since 
a within-year comparison was made, the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test was used. Separate analyses were 
conducted for each program. All statistical tests of 
associations were two-sided, and a p-value of <0.05 
was deemed to be statistically significant. Statistical 
analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 23.0 
(IBM Corp., New York, NY, USA). 
binding recruitment process reduces the need for a 
program to be competitive. Such a process may also 
result in disgruntled residents.4
Most advanced education programs have ad-
dressed this challenge by adopting the mechanism of 
Dental Residency Match (DRM). The DRM emerged 
from the national residency match program, devel-
oped in 1952 to assist medical programs in matching 
with potential medical residents. The services of this 
program were first extended to postdoctoral dental 
programs in 1985 in the form of the DRM, also re-
ferred to as “Match.” The DRM process was initially 
developed and organized by the oral and maxil-
lofacial surgery residency programs. This process 
was then expanded and is currently being utilized 
by other programs including Advanced Education 
in General Dentistry (AEGD) and General Practice 
Residency (GPR) programs and residency programs 
in orthodontics, pediatric dentistry (PED), and dental 
anesthesiology (ANES).5,6
The Match process involves students’ and 
graduates’ applying to their desired advanced 
education program, either directly or through the 
American Dental Education Association (ADEA)’s 
Postdoctoral Application Support Service (PASS). 
The programs then select the applicants they wish to 
interview. Based on the interview, the applicants and 
the programs submit their respective rankings to the 
National Matching Service (NMS). The NMS uses a 
“best fit” optimization algorithm to place individu-
als into positions, based entirely on the preferences 
that they state in their rank order lists. Neither the 
applicant nor the program is provided with rank-
ings of other applicants/programs and receive only 
information related to their own candidacy/pro-
gram.4,6 Thus, if strictly adhered to and uniformly 
adopted, the DRM process provides an ethical and 
unbiased selection process, based entirely on the 
mutual interests of the applicant and the program.4 
This process may result in increased satisfaction of 
both the matched applicants and the programs that 
they match into.7,8
Despite the advantages of the Match process, 
several programs in various PGD and specialty 
groups, as well as other ADA-recognized special-
ties, do not participate in the DRM. For example, 
the specialties of periodontics and endodontics do 
not participate in it.9,10 A previous study examined 
factors that contributed to one specialty residency 
program’s decision to participate or not participate 
in the DRM.4 The aims of this study were to conduct 
a descriptive analysis of DRM metrics for the years 
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and maxillofacial surgery p=0.01; pediatric dentistry 
p=0.01; orthodontics p=0.01; and dental anesthesiol-
ogy p=0.04).
The ratios of acceptable applicants per posi-
tions filled for all programs are shown in Figure 1. 
Overall, the ratio of acceptable applicants stayed 
relatively stable and ranged from a low of 0.8 (dental 
anesthesiology for 2015) to a high of 1.6 (orthodon-
tics in 2009, 2014, and 2015). For all these types of 
residencies except dental anesthesiology, there was 
trend towards increase in the number of acceptable 
applicants over the study period. This trend was most 
pronounced for GPR programs.
Across all years, the three specialty residencies 
(oral and maxillofacial surgery, pediatric dentistry, 
and orthodontics) did extremely well in filling posi-
tions in the DRM. Overall, more than 90% of all 
programs and 95% of all positions in these three 
specialties were filled in the DRM (Figure 2 and 
Figure 3). AEGD programs fared the worst in terms 
of filling their positions followed by GPR and dental 
anesthesiology programs.
The overall average ratio of the least preferred 
matched rank to the number of positions filled was 
computed for the three specialties (oral and maxil-
lofacial surgery, pediatric dentistry, and orthodontics; 
Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6). Close to 35% of 
oral and maxillofacial surgery programs, 30% of pe-
diatric dentistry programs, and 30% of orthodontics 
programs had a ratio of 1 to <1.5 for ratios of least 
preferred match rank/positions filled. 
Results
During the study period (2008 to 2015), six 
types of residency programs (GPR, AEGD, oral and 
maxillofacial surgery, pediatric dentistry, orthodon-
tics, and dental anesthesiology) participated in the 
DRM. Dental anesthesiology started participating 
in the year 2011. Over the study period, there was 
an increase in number of programs participating in 
the DRM. In 2008, a total of 408 programs (across 
five types of residencies) participated in the DRM, 
while in 2015 a total of 473 programs (across six 
types of residencies) participated. The total number 
of residency positions offered in the DRM increased 
from 1,716 (year 2008) to 2,065 (year 2015). GPR 
programs had the most number of positions offered 
through DRM annually, followed by pediatric den-
tistry, AEGD, orthodontics, oral and maxillofacial 
surgery, and dental anesthesiology. 
The mean and median numbers of ranks sub-
mitted by programs that filled all positions and those 
that did not are shown in Table 1. When Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests were used to compare differences 
in average number of ranks submitted per position 
offered in each year between programs that filled all 
their positions and those that did not, it was evident 
that programs able to fill all their positions ranked 
more applicants than programs that did not. These 
differences were statistically significant for all types 
of residencies (GPR p=0.01; AEGD p=0.01; oral 
Table 1. Average number of ranks offered per position for each type of postdoctoral program
  Programs Filled     
  All Positions         Number of Ranks All Years Combined  
Program Years in Match Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value
GPR 2008-15 Yes 4.11 4.05 0.24 0.01
  No 2.34 2.30 0.27 
AEGD 2008-15 Yes 3.25 3.35 0.22 0.01
  No 1.62 1.70 0.33 
Oral and maxillofacial surgery 2008-15 Yes 7.10 7.10 0.23 0.01
  No 4.31 4.30 1.00 
Pediatric dentistry 2008-15 Yes 4.56 4.55 0.17 0.01
  No 2.73 2.50 0.42 
Orthodontics 2008-15 Yes 4.96 5.00 0.12 0.01
  No 2.96 2.85 1.04 
Dental anesthesiology 2011-15 Yes 3.66 3.80 0.43 0.04
  No 1.60 1.40 0.62 
Note: The p-values were determined by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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students based on very little data about the qualities 
of the applicants, and students were accepting offers 
without adequate information about their options. 
These problems eventually led to widespread use 
of so-called “exploding offers” (offers often valid 
for only 12 hours). In some dental specialties, even 
in admission cycles of the past few years, we have 
observed that such exploding offers are not uncom-
mon. Consequent to that, non-Match-participating 
dental specialties have tried to establish what some 
called a “gentlemen’s agreement” in which programs 
agreed to communicate position offers to applicants 
only on or after a previously agreed set day.11 Medical 
programs made a similar attempt in the late 1940s 
that was said to have failed miserably.13 Adherence to 
this kind of courtesy agreement by dental residency 
programs seems limited at best.
In this context, we explored the metrics of 
DRM programs between 2008 and 2015. Match met-
rics have been reported more frequently by medical 
than dental specialties and are usually restricted to 
a particular type of specialty (primary care, family 
medicine, etc.).14,15 Considering the relatively limited 
number of types of dental residencies participating 
in the DRM, we were unable to explore metrics for 
the dental profession as a whole. Similar to previous 
reports in the medical literature, through this analysis 
we hoped to provide some lessons for programs that 
Discussion
Six types of advanced education programs in 
dentistry participate in the DRM program.6 Among 
the ADA-recognized specialties, periodontics, 
endodontics, prosthodontics, oral and maxillofacial 
pathology, oral and maxillofacial radiology, and den-
tal public health programs do not participate in the 
DRM. A comparison of the number of applicants to 
enrollments showed that, on average, the programs 
that did not participate in the DRM process typically 
had a lower number of applicants.3 This difference 
perhaps reflects the added difficulty applicants face 
in navigating the application systems of individual 
programs and dealing with the logistics of apply-
ing to multiple programs. For example, a survey of 
endodontic residents found that “respondents were 
not overwhelmingly satisfied with the application/
interview/selection process and 39% indicated they 
would have preferred a Match process.”11 In that 
study, the authors argued for an improved resident 
selection process. A previous study by Bell et al. 
found that endodontic directors were supportive of 
at least a uniform acceptance date for all programs.10
This situation mirrors what medical residency 
programs went through in the early 1900s.12,13 Hospi-
tals were filling positions with inexperienced medical 
Figure 1. Ratio of acceptable applicants per position filled, 2008-15
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Figure 2. Percentage of programs filled in DRM, 2008-15
Figure 3. Percentage of positions filled in DRM, 2008-15
participate in the Match process to enhance suc-
cessful outcomes. An additional goal was to report 
on Match outcomes that may or may not encourage 
nonparticipants to reassess their decision to not 
participate. 
The number of programs participating in-
creased over the years in the study, largely due to 
increased number of AEGD programs participating 
in the Match process. The number of positions of-
fered in the Match increased as well, also largely 
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Figure 4. Oral and maxillofacial surgery programs: percentages of ratios of least preferred match rank/positions filled, 
2008-15
Figure 5. Pediatric dentistry programs: percentages of ratios of least preferred match rank/positions filled, 2008-15
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more advanced dental procedures. It could also be 
a reflection of some state licensing boards’ move 
to licensing through advanced training in lieu of 
licensing exams. Alternatively, it could be due to the 
reluctance of new graduates to enter the job market 
due to depressed economic conditions during the time 
period of this study.16,17
Our results showed that anesthesiology pro-
grams had a decrease in the number of acceptable ap-
plicants and the lowest number of applicants among 
the programs participating in Match. Anesthesiology 
programs also fared worst among all the Match pro-
grams in filling positions. Dental schools may need 
to recognize this and help aspiring anesthesiologists 
prepare a career path toward residency programs by 
providing formative and summative assessments in 
dental anesthesiology concepts and utilizing robust 
feedback mechanisms to increase interest in the 
field. For example, dental schools could provide 
enhanced rotational opportunities in anesthesiology 
for students that emphasize one-on-one contact time 
with trained dental anesthesiologists. Such special-
ist contact has been found to have some success in 
due to an increase in number of AEGD and GPR 
positions. Our study found that programs that filled 
all their positions submitted a larger number of ranks 
per position than programs that did not fill all their 
positions. This pattern was evident for all the types 
of programs in the study. This finding suggests that, 
if filling all positions is one of the programs’ objec-
tives, they need to submit more ranks. Increasing 
the number of ranks submitted may result in better 
matching and filling their positions. However, it 
does not necessarily mean that the programs can fill 
positions with the same quality of applicants unless 
there are more applicants to the program. This is an 
important issue that warrants further exploration. 
The lack of data on total number of applications to 
a program precluded us from examining that factor, 
which is an inherent limitation of the study. 
It was particularly encouraging to see an 
increase in the number of acceptable applicants, 
especially among GPR programs. The ratio of ac-
ceptable applicants per position also stayed relatively 
stable. This finding likely reflects the interest among 
recently graduated dentists to gain experiences in 
Figure 6. Orthodontics programs: percentages of ratios of least preferred match rank/positions filled, 2008-15
March 2017 ■ Journal of Dental Education 285
Disclosure
The authors declared no conflicts of interest 
associated with the conduct of the study or publica-
tion of its findings. 
REFERENCES
1.  Nashleanas BM, McKernan SC, Kuthy RA, Qian F. Career 
influences among final year dental students who plan to 
enter private practice. BMC Oral Health 2014;14(1):18. 
2.  Texas court ruling allows non-ADA-recognized specialty 
dentists to advertise as “specialists.” ADA News. At: 
www.ada.org/en/publications/ada-news/2016-archive/
january/texas-court-ruling-allows-non-ada-recognized-
specialty-dentists-to-advertise-as-specialists. Accessed 
4 Apr. 2016.
3.  American Dental Education Association. ADEA snapshot 
of dental education, 2015-16. At: www.adea.org/snap-
shot/. Accessed 4 Apr. 2016.
4.  Allareddy V, Srinivasan S, Southard TE. Match or non-
match: at the crossroads. Am J Orthod Dentofacial Orthop 
2015;148(5):748-54. 
5.  da Fonseca MA, Pollock M, Majewski R, et al. Factors 
influencing candidates’ choice of a pediatric dental resi-
dency program. J Dent Educ 2007;71(9):1194-202. 
6.  National Dental Matching Services, Inc. Postdoctoral den-
tal matching program. At: www.natmatch.com/dentres/. 
Accessed 4 Apr. 2016.
7.  Laskin DM, Lesny RJ, Best AM. The residents’ viewpoint 
of the matching process, factors influencing their program 
selection, and satisfaction with the results. J Oral Maxil-
lofac Surg 2003;61(2):228-33. 
8.  Spina AM, Smith TA, Marciani RD, Marshall EO. A 
survey of resident selection procedures in oral and maxil-
lofacial surgery. J Oral Maxillofac Surg 2000;58(6):660-6. 
9.  Khan S, Carmosino AJ, Yuan JCC, et al. Postdoctoral 
periodontal program directors’ perspectives on resident 
selection. J Periodontol 2015;86(2):177-84. 
10. Bell LT, Sukotjo C, Yuan JCC, Johnson BR. Applicant 
selection procedures in endodontic specialty programs in 
the United States: program directors’ perspective. J Endod 
2014;40(6):797-804. 
11. Woodmansey KF, He J, Glickman GN. Residents’ percep-
tions of the graduate endodontic application selection 
process and match. J Endod 2015;41(8):1248-52. 
12. Nagarkar PA, Janis JE. Fixing the “match”: how to play 
the game. J Grad Med Educ 2012;4(2):142-7. 
13. Sapareto S, Zhu XR, Orton CG. Point/counterpoint: medi-
cal physics residents should be placed using a matching 
program. Med Phys 2014;41(6):060601. 
14. Flannery MT. The 2014 United States National Residency 
Match Program data for primary care programs: a review. 
Eur J Intern Med 2015;26(1):6-8. 
15. Kozakowski S, Crosley P, Bentley A. Results of the 2014 
national resident matching program: family medicine. 
Fam Med 2014;46(9):701-6.
16. Dhima M, Petropoulos V. Dental students’ perceptions 
of dental specialties and factors influencing specialty and 
career choices. J Dent Educ 2012;76(5):562-73. 
increasing student interest in the specialty of oral 
and maxillofacial surgery.18 Another mechanism is 
the creation of a predoctoral study club for dental 
anesthesiology. Given that predoctoral students 
receive limited exposure to dental anesthesiology, 
such focused programs could help students become 
more aware of the skills and talent they have for that 
specialty. This awareness has been found to be one of 
the most important reasons students choose to pursue 
a particular specialty.19 An alternative explanation 
for the lower number of acceptable applicants and 
reduction in the number of filled positions in dental 
anesthesiology could be due to the fact that they are 
relatively new entrants to the DRM process.
We found that oral and maxillofacial surgery, 
pediatric dentistry, and orthodontics programs were 
able to fill their residency positions and they were 
able to do that with a greater cohort of acceptable 
applicants. Their success rates probably reflect the 
inherent attractions of those specialties.16,20,21 AEGD 
programs fared the worst among the cohorts. That 
finding could be explained as reflection of the in-
creased number of positions, resulting in a surplus 
situation. Alternatively, increasing student loan 
burden may be preventing students from enrolling in 
PGD programs if the economic advantage of quickly 
paying off loans is not as apparent as for other ad-
vanced programs.1,16 
Conclusion
Through this study, we identified important 
trends that may be useful for programs and residency 
applicants, so that they can become successful in 
identifying mutually beneficial matches through the 
DRM process. Participation in DRM is increasing, 
and we hope the increased adoption will encourage 
more programs to become part of this process. The 
Match offers an ethical and unbiased mechanism, 
which simplifies and reduces the burden on students 
intending to pursue advanced training. If filling posi-
tions is an important objective for advanced dental 
education programs, it is safe to conclude that pro-
grams need to submit greater number of ranks. Dental 
schools also need to note the reduction in acceptable 
applicants to anesthesiology programs. Consequent 
to this, exposure to advanced procedures as well as 
exposure to specialty role models must be encour-
aged. In addition, structured programs to encourage 
future residents should be offered in dental schools.
286 Journal of Dental Education ■ Volume 81, Number 3
20. Ricker K, Mihas P, Lee JY, et al. Educators’ and ap-
plicants’ views of the postdoctoral pediatric dentistry 
admission process: a qualitative study. J Dent Educ 
2015;79(11):1272-8. 
21. Shin JH, Kinnunen TH, Zarchy M, et al. Factors influ-
encing dental students’ specialty choice: a survey of 
ten graduating classes at one institution. J Dent Educ 
2015;79(4):369-77. 
17. Vujicic M, Wall T, Nasseh K, Munson B. Dentist income 
levels slow to recover. Health Policy Resource Center. 
Chicago: American Dental Association, 2013. 
18. Marciani RD, Smith TA, Heaton LJ. Applicants’ opinions 
about the selection process for oral and maxillofacial sur-
gery programs. J Oral Maxillofac Surg 2003;61(5):608-14. 
19. Saeed S, Jimenez M, Howell H, et al. Which factors influ-
ence students’ selection of advanced graduate programs? 
One institution’s experience. J Dent Educ 2008;72(6): 
688-97. 
